Occidental Malakut

Post-election analysis by a wide gamut of Iranian political quarters and persuasions tend to share a general understanding of the rather stark choice faced in the elections by the Ayatollah and the conservative establishment. Despite Mousavi’s known political posture and background as former prime minister in the 1980s and expressed distance from  the reform platform (or at least some of its radical political positions and demands), the election campaign unfolded in a manner that went beyond his expectations – and equally of others. What might have been deemed as a lackluster campaign by an old-guard politician who had been out of active politics for two decades, picked up momentum during the final weeks of the campaign. His solid pro-change, pro-reform discourse, with an increasingly progressive, pluralistic social and cultural content, energized the youth, released huge pent-up frustrations, shook the apparent apathy of large segments of the urban populace and attracted huge supporters from all walks of life inside the country. What came to be known as the “Green Movement” also found strong resonance among the sizeable Iranian community abroad, the majority of whom could be considered either apolitical or of an active oppositional persuasion. The televised debates between Mr. Ahmadinejad - the incumbent president – and the other candidates, particularly Mr. Mousavi – the principal challenger – served to beat the original intent and purpose. Contrary to the expectations of the establishment, these sessions helped to totally discredit the incumbent as an out-and-out demagogue, unscrupulous populist political animal, and worse, a pathetic, clumsy liar – a man just too small for the job. The debates simultaneously served to portray a much more congenial picture of Mousavi as a soft-spoken, seasoned, mature politician representing principle, reason and moderation and a brighter future through collective wisdom at home and interaction with the outside world. On the eve of the elections, it was all but a foregone conclusion that Mousavi was set to win with a comfortable margin, if not a landslide – similar to Khatami’s 1997 surprise victory. The worst-case scenario for the pro-reform camp was that vote rigging in the order of few millions would send Mousavi and Ahmadinejad to the run-off elections.

A Mousavi victory would have implied substantial policy changes in practically all areas – both domestic and foreign. However, given his commitment, as a matter of principle, to the Islamic Revolution and its original ideals and aspirations and for that matter, the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, inclusive of the institution and office of the Velayat-e Faqih (Guardian Jurisconsult/Supreme Leader), his presidency would not have threatened the constitutional position of the Leader per se. But, in light of the on-going and unresolved tussle in the country since 1997  between the pro-reform platform on the one side and the Ayatollah and the conservative establishment and its institutions of power on the other side on the interpretation of the Leader’s constitutional powers and authority and his practical engagement in policy-making and execution, Mousavi’s victory would have most probably implied a more legal reading, interpretation and implementation of the Constitution and its provisions.. Also in light of Mousavi’s independent personality and character, his assumption of office would have most probably implied a more constitutional presidency backed by a strong popular mandate, a more independent Judiciary and less omnipresent, intrusive Leader, with a constitutionally-guaranteed office yet somewhat trimmed interventionist wings. His  presidency would have also implied a much less political role – and economic function - for the Sepah (Revolutionary Guards Corps) and a sprawling security apparatus, who have come to permeate and dominate the entire state structure and bureaucracy during the past four years under Ahmadinejad. It was the Guards’ active institutional involvement in the elections back in 2005 that helped him win the race. No wonder, then, that Sepah has gradually become the biggest actor/contractor in the national economy, and its members – uniformed and otherwise - have come to pack the state bureaucracy at different levels, including the Majlis (Parliament) where over 100 deputies are former Sepah officers.

Therefore, the political gamble by the Ayatollah and the entire conservative establishment to thwart the outcome of the elections had a single, overarching objective in mind – to preserve the status quo and prevent structural and policy changes with possible ominous repercussions. Preservation of status quo, implying an omnipresent powers and authority for the person of the Leader and his ever-increasing reliance on a powerful, politically engaged Revolutionary Guards and dreaded security apparatus would have been possible only with an Ahmadinejad victory. Such an overall outlook and policy framework would have also ensured the practical pursual of an aggressive, confrontational foreign policy, as has been the case during the past four years and will continue to be the case from now on in all probability – with not-so-disguised objectives in different areas, including with regard to the nuclear issue. The dominant security state in Iran seems to have felt the dire need to fend off the potent, unsettling challenge from within the system, preserve the status quo, further isolate the pro-reform forces and consolidate the power structure, and continue pursuing the security and military policies it considers imperative for its mere survival. Moreover, certain political, military and security circles and quarters in Iran have never disguised their deep appreciation of the Chinese brutal massacre at Tiananmen Square and the North Korean style governance and foreign policy objectives. The political coup that was pulled off at the Election Headquarters at end of the elections day should, therefore, be seen and analyzed from this vantage point and as the practical response of that particular secret nucleus in the military-security apparatus to such needs and preferences. It may not be clearly known at this stage yet whether the Ayatollah and his inner circle were part of the original plan or they joined the bandwagon at some point, or whether alternatively he was confronted with an actual situation by the military-security coup-makers, leaving him with no other option but to support the fait accompli. Whatever the details of the genesis of plan and its execution, the actual outcome is all the same. The Ayatollah’s unethical pretensions and categorical rejection of electoral impropriety and fraud – and worse, firm signature on the treachery in favor of Ahmadinejad and subsequent sanctioning of bloody repression – make him a full-fledged accomplice in the whole criminal undertaking. 

II- Systemic Implications

Looking at the national chess game five weeks after the vote, one thing seems all too clear: the political coup against the republican aspect of the Islamic Republic – popular participation and vote - has succeeded in its immediate objective. Mousavi’s victory has been effectively thwarted, Ahmadinejad has been brought out of the ballot box and declared as the incoming president, and the popular movement protesting election fraud and rigging has been brutally suppressed, driven off the streets, and seemingly contained for the moment. Detained prominent political activists are under torture to produce bogus confessions, hundreds more of civil and political activists, journalists, lawyers, and academics languish in jails awaiting prosecution on thumped up charges as ‘foreign stooges for a velvet revolution.’ Arbitrary arrest and detention of activists and journalists continue on a daily basis. And a heavy-handed, overwhelming military and security presence and the openly expressed resolve to resort to wanton violence and repression – even bloodshed a la Tiananmen - seem to have cautioned the popular, unorganized peaceful mass movement not to risk a precipitous, unequal street fight. The unelected president, while suffering domestic scorn and infamy and international isolation, is set to receive the Ayatollah’s official sanction as the incoming president and take the oath of office at the Majlis (Parliament) within the next few weeks. His second term will commence in late August.

While the political coup has succeeded in its immediate, tactical objective, the Supreme Leader, the Guardian Council, Mr. Ahmadinejad, and the entire political establishment have lost their political credibility and moral authority in the eyes of the majority of Iranians – at home and abroad. The election shenanigans proved extremely costly, particularly from both structural and strategic perspectives; trading short-term victory and power grab for loss of moral authority and political legitimacy cannot but be considered a short-sighted gamble. Also, the ruling establishment’s resort to election fraud on such a massive scale and its subsequent reliance on open repression has made it abundantly clear to the populace at large and the wide range of political forces and currents still acting within the framework of the Constitution that seeking political reform from within the system has all but been rendered meaningless and impossible. This should be considered a defining moment for the entire system, both the establishment and the fast-expanding democratic opposition. The very fact that the slogans shouted during the mass demonstrations – and now from the rooftops in the darkness of the night – have undergone dramatic shifts and are now directed at the person of the Ayatollah and the institution of Velayat-e Faqih, and in a sense, the ruling theocratic state, are clearly telling. They indicate the substantive change in the tenor and content of the demands of the popular democratic movement and its ultimate, long-term objectives – establishment of a full-fledged democratic, pluralistic republic free from ideological (religious) strictures.
It is true, however, that there exists a discernible disconnect between the substantive democratic slogans and demands of the popular movement as reflected in the street slogans and demands on the one hand, and on the other the immediate political platform pursued by Mr. Mousavi – and for that matter, all pro-reform politicians and activists such as former President Khatami. Mousavi, Khatami and the wide array of pro-reform political forces and currents and activists have called in their public pronouncements for peaceful political activity within constitutional bounds, and have vowed to continue their protests peacefully towards the realization of the trampled rights of the citizenry – vague general demands at best. Cancellation of the fraudulent elections was the original demand of Mr. Mousavi and the protest movement, and still continues to be considered their principal demand, even if rendered less likely now that the entire state system has resolved to keep course, stand firm behind Ahmadinejad, and fight it out. As reported, Mousavi intends to establish a political party and also work with all pro-reform forces and currents within the framework of an overarching political coalition or front to continue the protest movement. The rather limited agenda Mousavi and others are on record to have set for the current stage of the movement is to be understood within the actual parameters of the prevailing situation and the official propaganda campaign accusing him and other leaders and activists of subservience to foreign powers and calling for their prosecution, trial and punishment.

III- Looking to the Future     

It is not clear at all at this stage how the Ayatollah, his unelected president and the entire Iranian state will deal with the deep-seated and growing crisis of political legitimacy, and control and subdue the increasingly simmering socio-political situation in the country  in the short- and medium-term. Nor is it clear how they will manage – to some degree of success – their intrinsically difficult foreign relations with a partly hostile and partly less-than-friendly outside world. It is yet to be seen how these two intricately linked and mutually feeding situations will unfold in the coming weeks and months. But, while the immediate picture ahead looks and remains murky, uncertain and even perilous for both sides, it could be said with a high degree of certainty that politics and the political equation in Iran as used to be the case prior to the June elections is gone once and for all. The seemingly unchallenged rule of the Ayatollah and the supremacy of the system of Velayat-e Faqih as the lynchpin of the theocratic state has been challenged effectively – not only by millions of angry Iranians on the streets but also by an increasing number of the Shi’ite clergy at various levels of the clerical hierarchy who are finding it difficult to acquiesce to, let alone support, the current blatantly repressive, unpopular policies and practices that can hardly be camouflaged and sold as anything religious or Islamic.Critical pronouncements by an increasing number of formerly supportive clerical figures do not bode well for the Ayatollah and the entire governmental establishment under him. An immediate case in point is the sermon this past Friday by former President Hashemi Rafsanjani, currently the Head of the Expediency Council as well as the Council of Experts, in which he decidedly chose to keep silent on the Ayatollah and his definitive rulings on the election and its outcome, took distance from the official propaganda line and judiciously sided with the popular concerns and grievances. He referred, among others, to the widespread doubts among the populace, especially the highly educated, in the veracity of the election outcome, and emphasized the necessity of addressing these doubts. He also called for the release of political detainees and the relaxation of the current stifling constraints and censorship imposed on the media and press.. Even though he voiced such explicit criticisms while underlining his decades-long commitment and service to the Islamic Revolution and also as his way of extending a helping hand to the Islamic Republic in times of political crisis, his independent posture and critical outlook have proved quite unsettling to various conservative quarters and invited venomous public attacks against him. Further expressions of support for or denunciation of his critical statement, as already manifest in the press and mass media, are bound to sharpen the ever-widening chasm within the clerical establishment and the state bureaucracy. Indications are that more desertions, both by lay and clerical supporters, appear to be inevitable as the democratic movement deepens and continues taking its toll on the current power-holders with a shrinking constituency solely bent on pursuing their unpopular political and security agenda vis-à-vis a wounded, uncooperative, impatient, and hostile populace.  As borne out by experiences in the past – as recent as the days of the Islamic Revolution in the late 1970s – active tension and sporadic street clashes between military and security forces on the one hand and unarmed street demonstrators on the other tend to lead to attrition, loss of morale and gradual desertion from within the ranks of the men in uniform.The quite expected difficult days ahead of the authorities in Tehran will be further compounded should they continue their current aggressive and recalcitrant foreign policy – as reflected in Ahmadinejad’s grandstanding and extremely bellicose remarks in recent days laying out his plans for the second term. As is widely known, the leadership in the Islamic Republic has long relied on a verbally radical and populist “anti-imperialist” foreign posture. Reliance on xenophobic propaganda campaigns and rallying support for certain foreign policy objectives, especially in times of internal difficulty, has always been pursued with vigor during the past three decades. That outlook and policy under Ahmadinejad during his first term was primarily focused on the nuclear issue. This   political expediency still continues to be the case, and is currently further aggravated by a high profile world campaign of solidarity with the unfolding democratic movement and against the on-going repression and massive human rights violations in Iran . Ahmadinejad’s last minute cancellation of attendance at the OAU Summit in Libya a couple of weeks back, indefinite postponement of the state visit by the Sultan of Oman to Tehran, and his decision to stay away from the Non-Aligned Movement Summit last week in Egypt clearly point in the direction of a creeping sense of political insecurity and the mounting pressure of international isolation. Given such a predicament and the strong possibility that outside pressures will persist, at least on the human rights issues, it is difficult to foresee how a much challenged, discredited and isolated Ayatollah-Ahmadinejad team would afford to change gear, make a political-diplomatic U-turn, and opt for a moderated outlook and approach and engage in genuine interaction with their foreign critics and detractors on a wide range of thorny and intractable issues. The US prevarication and Europe’s apparent serious difficulty in extending open recognition to Ahmadinejad as the ‘legitimate’ winner in Iran elections are bound to make his days harder ahead. His continued aggressive and confrontational approach and conduct – driven solely by domestic political considerations - will further complicate the prospects for any meaningful rapproachment with the US on all outstanding bilateral issues, and fruitful negotiations with the 5+1 and the UN Security Council on the nuclear dossier.

As a final reckoning, it can be said that politics in Iran as was the case prior to the June elections has practically come to an end. What transpired in the country over a deeply controversial process and disputed outcome has radically shaken the entire political system, challenged the very foundations of the ruling theocracy, and made the once highly revered, almost untouchable Ayatollah the subject of amusing anecdotes and daily death wishes. The political gamble of stealing in broad daylight of the votes of millions of Iranians who came out peacefully and out of sheer hope to vote for their preferred candidate – a man with established credentials within the existing system of governance and committed to its constitutional perpetuation – simply backfired. The  gamble, short-sighted as it has proved, instead produced a huge army of angry protesters and a fast gathering democratic movement calling for the demise of the men in power and the corrupt, cruel system they represent. This seems to represent the end of a chapter in Iran ’s tumultuous contemporary history and the beginning of another – the contours of which Iranians (let alone others) are not yet in a position to discern and describe. But, the writing is on the wall; the future, no matter how far away and however painfully gained, will be different – radically and substantially different, in name, form, content, and everything. The present is already the future; it is only a matter of when not if. Given the inevitability of change in Iran and its politics and polity somewhere down the line (a few years at most), the outside world – everybody, friend or foe, close or far, in Iran’s immediate neighborhood or beyond, big or small, mighty or weak - might find it a better, wiser and more advisable strategic approach and policy to keep an eye on the emerging future Iran while dealing as a matter of their current expediencies, short-term interests, or specific priority issues, with an already doomed governance structure.